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Oral Histories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed, and not
the official position of MORS. Omissions and
errors in fact are corrected when possible, but
every effort is made to present the interviewee’s
own words.
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Jack R. Borsting, FS was MORS
President 1970–1971. This article includes
both an interview with Dr. Borsting as well
as a transcript of the Heritage Session at the
72nd MORS Symposium at the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS), Monterey, Califor-
nia, 23 June 2004. The 72nd Heritage Session
featured Jack Borsting and Wayne Hughes,
FS. Wayne was one of Jack’s premier stu-
dents at NPS and his oral history was pub-
lished in MOR, Volume 9, Number 4, 2004.
BOB SHELDON:We are located in the
historic offices of Herrmann Hall at the Na-
val Postgraduate School at Monterey, Cali-
fornia. Mike Garrambone and I are here
with Dr. Borsting to attend the 72nd MORS
Symposium. Dr. Borsting, would you start
by telling us where you were born and
raised?
JACK BORSTING: I was born in Port-
land, Oregon on 31 January 1929 and raised
in Portland Oregon.
BOB SHELDON: Who were your par-
ents and how did they influence you in
your studies?
JACK BORSTING: My father’s name
was Johannes, or John, Sorenson Borsting.
My mother’s name was Ruth Marie Nelson.
My father was an immigrant from Den-
mark with a fifth grade education in Den-
mark. His brother got him to come to this
country and he later became a butter maker
and then half owner of a creamery. My
mother’s parents were Swedish. They im-
migrated and she was born in this country.
To support her parents, she had to quit
high school at age 16. My parents wanted
me to get as much education as possible.
They didn’t have much education, but they
encouraged me. They told me I was going
to college when I was in grade school. They
didn’t push me, but they wanted me to go
to college. I specialized in mathematics be-
cause it was easy for me.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What high
school did you go to and what did you
study?
JACK BORSTING: I went to elemen-
tary and high school in Portland. I took a
general pre-college course in high school. I
went to Franklin High School in Portland,
Oregon and took as much mathematics as I
could. I wish I had taken some foreign lan-
guages in high school. This was a big mis-
take. I ended up taking two years of Ger-
man in college, but it would have been
much better if I had taken a language ear-
lier. I went to Oregon State University as an
undergraduate and received my masters
and Ph.D. from the University of Oregon.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have an
early inclination towards mathematics?
JACK BORSTING: When I went to
college I wanted to be an electrical engi-
neer. After little less than one semester, I
became tired of writing tedious lab reports
and having my fraternity brothers copy
them and got A’s and I got B’s because
mine were not neat enough. At that point, I
decided to switch to mathematics, and so
all of my degrees are in mathematics.
BOB SHELDON: What kind of math-
ematics did you focus on?
JACK BORSTING: I have always had
an interest in statistics and probability the-
ory, but my doctorate is actually in abstract
mathematics, but with an emphasis on
probability theory and statistical theory.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have any
notable professors?
JACK BORSTING: I had a lot of nota-
ble professors. At the master’s level and
starting the doctorate, there was Will Dixon
and Frank Massey, who went on to
U.C.L.A. and worked in Biostatistics. They
taught a very good mix of applied and
theoretical statistics. I did my doctoral
work under Herman Ruben, who was sim-
ply a genius.
BOB SHELDON: As you were going
through school, how did you view your job
opportunities?
JACK BORSTING: When I was in
graduate school, I thought about becoming
an actuary, and I took the first three actuary
exams and passed them. Some actuarial
companies knew I was working on my doc-
torate and they wanted to hire me. But they
wouldn’t pay any more money if I got my
Ph.D. So I decided it wasn’t worth it and I
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would go into industry as a mathematician
when I got my doctorate.
BOB SHELDON: What was your first job
in industry?
JACK BORSTING: I didn’t go right into
industry. My first job after my doctorate was in
academia. I turned down all my industrial of-
fers, and applied to two academic institutions.
One was the University of Oregon Medical
Dental School and the other was the Naval
Postgraduate School. I had to decide between
these two offers and I chose to go to the Naval
Postgraduate School.
BOB SHELDON: Who recruited you from
NPS?
JACK BORSTING: That’s a good question.
I guess it was the Chairman of the Mathematics
Department.
BOB SHELDON: Were they looking for
mathematicians and statisticians?
JACK BORSTING: They were looking for
a statistician, and by chance, I was attending a
meeting at NPS as a graduate student. I rode
down on a bus from Palo Alto with a meteo-
rology professor and he told me all about the
school. I sent off a resume and we started talk-
ing and I ended up at NPS. One thing I should
mention in between my masters and doctorate
degrees; I went into the Air Force and spent
two years as an Air Force officer.
BOB SHELDON: What year did you go
into the Air Force?
JACK BORSTING: It was 1954 to 1956. I
spent two years as an engineer working on
“practice” nuclear weapons for the Air Force at
Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New
Mexico. Then after the two years, I came back
and finished my doctorate in Oregon.
BOB SHELDON: Were you working for
AFOTEC, the Air Force Operational Test and
Evaluation Center?
JACK BORSTING: I’m not sure about
AFOTEC. I worked in what was called the De-
velopment Directorate at Kirtland. We worked
with practice nuclear weapons. I was a project
officer working with practice nuclear weapons
and one of the more interesting projects was
trying to develop a practice unit for the Genie,
which was an air-to-air atomic warhead rocket
for the F-102. The rocket was not supposed to
hit the target, because it was an atomic war-
head rocket. It was designed to blast out the
target; the practice unit was a smaller caliber
rocket. One of the difficulties in developing a
practice weapon was that you were not sup-
posed to hit the target. You were just supposed
to be in the vicinity. We also wanted a cheap
practice unit.
Another project was to develop a sub-cali-
ber bomb that simulated an atomic weapon that
was carried externally on the F-86 fighter. We
found that the Navy had developed a practice
unit called the Aero 5A. The Aero 5A carried six
Mark 76 practice bombs whose ballistics simu-
lated the parent weapon.
BOB SHELDON:Were you using statistics
or engineering principles?
JACK BORSTING: I didn’t use any statis-
tics. Basically, I was just an applied engineer at
Kirtland using basic engineering principles. I
had other projects too.
BOB SHELDON: Was your test a success?
JACK BORSTING: Yes, we developed, we
tested, and we fixed the Aero 5A and made it so
it would drop one unit at a time. Remember the
project was to develop a sub-caliber practice
unit for an atomic warhead bomb. It was the
Aero 5A that needed work and it had a Mark 76
practice unit that simulated one of these units
that was carried externally on an F-86 fighter.
The flight maneuver would release the bomb
from the aircraft and it turned out the Mark 76
simulated the right ballistics. The Aero 5A did
not initially work. It either dropped one unit at
a time, or six of them. So we ended up fixing it
and the Air Force purchased the unit from the
Navy. This was a low altitude bombing system.
As I mentioned earlier I also was the project
officer on the atomic warhead practice unit for
the Genie missile, which was an atomic air-to-
air missile that was delivered from the F-102. I
had the job of developing an inexpensive prac-
tice unit. The contractor on the practice unit
was Douglas Aircraft, and it did develop a
sub-caliber unit that did simulate the ballistics
of the parent atomic air-to-air rocket. We pre-
sented it at the Pentagon to the Air Force. After
I left the Air Force, they decided it was too
expensive to buy and they did not buy the
practice unit. The Genie on the other hand was
certainly fitted out for the F-102.
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BOB SHELDON: What made you decide
to enter the Air Force?
JACK BORSTING: I had an ROTC com-
mission.
BOB SHELDON: Was that a four-year
ROTC scholarship?
JACK BORSTING: No. I had two years of
undergraduate ROTC at Oregon State; every-
body was required to take it. I then decided to
take advanced ROTC, but it was not on a schol-
arship. The Air Force did not give scholarships.
I had a scholarship to go to undergraduate
school, but the Navy was the one who gave
scholarships at that time, that is, Air Force
ROTC. I got my commission in the Air Force
and I received a deferment for a while, but I
ended up being called into the Air Force for a
two-year tour.
BOB SHELDON: So you came out after
two years and went back to graduate school?
JACK BORSTING: Yes.
BOB SHELDON: Was there anything else
of value from your initial Air Force experience?
Did you learn a tester’s attitude?
JACK BORSTING: I had a tester’s attitude,
but I also learned to deal with industry, because
we had projects with industry. As a young
lieutenant I learned to work with other Air
Force officers and I obtained project manage-
ment experience. I had several projects where I
was the project leader. That was a lot of respon-
sibility for a young lieutenant who was inexpe-
rienced.
BOB SHELDON: So you went back a more
mature graduate student?
JACK BORSTING: Oh yes. I went back a
much more mature graduate student.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s jump forward in
time to when you decided to go to the Naval
Postgraduate School. How many other faculty
members were in your department?
JACK BORSTING: I am not sure. There
were two other statisticians and I don’t remem-
ber how many mathematicians. One of the rea-
sons I came to the Naval Postgraduate School
was because it had an operations research mas-
ter’s degree. It was started probably about the
time the move from Annapolis to Monterey
took place around 1951. It was an interdiscipli-
nary operations research program that was a
joint degree between the mathematics depart-
ment and the physics department.
BOB SHELDON: What courses did you
teach initially?
JACK BORSTING: The first course I
taught was a course in vector analysis and then
I taught probability theory and statistics, and
then various other types of statistics courses.
BOB SHELDON: Did they allow you time
to do some research?
JACK BORSTING: Yes. The teaching re-
quirement was a little high at NPS, which was
disappointing at first, but I did do some re-
search.
BOB SHELDON: What was your research
topic?
JACK BORSTING: Some of my early re-
search was in applied meteorology. I was try-
ing to predict anti-cyclones and published
some papers in the Journal of Applied Meteo-
rology.
BOB SHELDON: Was this related to your
Ph.D. dissertation?
JACK BORSTING: My Ph.D. dissertation
was in theoretical probability theory and was
not related at all.
BOB SHELDON: What year did you start
teaching here and how many students did you
have in your typical classes?
JACK BORSTING: It was 1959, and I
would say we had about 35 to 40 students in the
basic classes.
BOB SHELDON: How did you like your
students?
JACK BORSTING: The students at the
NPS were very motivated. They worked very
hard. Their background may have not been
great to do some of the quantitative work. They
would have to catch up, but they were really
motivated to work hard. They also expected the
professor to work hard. My role models in
teaching at the University of Oregon were not
great. They were kind of sloppy teachers. I was
better than they were, but I don’t think I was
very good compared to what I should have
been. The students at NPS in their course eval-
uations made some good comments. I listened
to the students comments and became a much
better teacher. I eventually became an excellent
teacher here, but I wasn’t that great initially.
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BOB SHELDON: Did you have any nota-
ble students?
JACK BORSTING: One of the early OR
students who graduated from here was a flag
officer, whose name was Conrad Abhau. There
were other students who made flag officer rank
in the early years of the program. One was Tom
Hughes, who made three stars. In his last as-
signment, he headed the logistics department
of the Navy. He is now a visiting chair profes-
sor at Monterey. Another student was Joe Met-
calf, who was retired as a three-star. He ended
up heading the Granada operation. Another
early student that made flag was Bob Ailes.
One of my early students who I kept in touch
with was Wayne Hughes. He had several
classes from me.
BOB SHELDON: How many different
classes were you teaching?
JACK BORSTING: I taught a lot of the
basic probability and statistics courses, plus I
taught a matrix algebra course. I also taught an
advanced applied statistics course. Another
early student in Wayne’s class was Jim Roche.
He made Captain, got out of the Navy, and had
a very successful tenure at Northrop Grum-
man. He could have made Admiral, but he
decided to get out when he was a Navy Cap-
tain. He later became Secretary of the Air Force.
I am sure there were others who I can’t remem-
ber at the moment.
BOB SHELDON: You were teaching statis-
tics before we had computers and high-pow-
ered calculators. Were your students able to
keep up with pencil and paper calculations to
do statistics?
JACK BORSTING: We did have calcula-
tors, but the school also installed the first Con-
trol Data Computer off the assembly line. The
Control Data 1604 was installed at the school
so the students had the use of a fast mainframe.
Of course, they were using punch cards and
they did a lot of thesis work programming in
FORTRAN and other languages. It wasn’t as
bad as when I went to school. I had slow cal-
culators. The school (NPS) has been pretty
much of a leader in computing facilities. The
Control Data 1604 was a very fast computer at
that time, in 1961. One of its problems was it
did not have the software that an IBM machine
had.
BOB SHELDON: How much space did
that first computer take up?
JACK BORSTING: Quite a bit of space. I
am trying to remember where it was installed.
I can’t remember where, but it did take up a
very good size roomwith all the disc drives, the
CPU, and auxiliary equipment. One of the frus-
trating things about early computers I do re-
member. I wanted to get my students manipu-
lating data on the computer and it turned out
that the biostatistics group at U.C.L.A., my
former professors Dixon and Massey, had de-
veloped what was called at that time the bio
med programs. They were applied statistical
programs that could be run on the Control Data
1604. So I got these programs here, and I was
trying to show my students how you could
manipulate data and change the regression line.
For example if you take out outliers the regres-
sion lines may change significantly. I did get
this type of material on the 1604, but the only
problem was whenever I wanted to run it for
students, the computer would be down. So I
ended up taking a movie of it and showing
them the movie. The early days of computers
were frustrating. It’s still frustrating at times,
and you can only do so much with a computer.
BOB SHELDON: When you were generat-
ing your lesson plans, did you get any help
from the Navy for what parts of the curriculum
they wanted to emphasize in statistics?
JACK BORSTING: Sure. Now let me go a
little ahead in time and I will bring that up
when I talk about the Operations Research De-
partment, which is very germane to what you
want us to talk about today. In approximately
1962, a professor in the Math Department by
the name of Tom Oberbeck talked the Provost
and the Superintendent into forming an Oper-
ations Research Department. He was in the
Math Department. It turned out that I decided
to stay in the Math Department. The other prin-
cipals in the Operations Research program
were Professor Torrance and Professor Cun-
ningham. Professor Torrance was a mathema-
tician, Professor Cunningham was a physicist.
They decided to stay in their respective depart-
ments. So, Tom Oberbeck had to recruit faculty
members for this fledgling department. Then in
1964, he got into a fight with the Superinten-
dent and Provost. He quit, expecting to be
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asked back. I think they were happy to see him
leave because he was a thorn in their side. In
June of 1964 I got a call to meet with the Super-
intendent in his office. He said he would like
me to become the Chairman of the OR Depart-
ment and move from the Math Department to
the Operations Research Department. This was
a surprise, as I was a young associate professor
at the time. I was not ready for a management
position. And I said, “How long do I have to
decide?”
BOB SHELDON: Were you tenured?
JACK BORSTING: Yes. I was tenured. He
said, “24 hours.” It was about five o’clock then,
and he said, “See me back here the next day at
five.” So I went home and talked to my family.
I also talked to Commander Paul Wolff, from
the Fleet Numerical Weather Facility. I worked
a lot with him on applied meteorology prob-
lems. He told me that the OR program was the
most important program here for the Navy and
I would be a fool not to accept. The Superin-
tendent had also told me that. He said, “This is
the most important program at the Naval Post-
graduate School and I want you to chair it”. So
I came back at 5 o’clock the next day and told
him I would chair the department. This pre-
sented an interesting challenge in my career in
that I did not know that much about operations
research.
BOB SHELDON: How old were you at the
time?
JACK BORSTING: I was about 35 and I
still wasn’t a full professor. The market for
operations research faculty members was very
tight because a lot of schools were starting OR
programs and there was no nucleus to build
from in the department. There were a couple of
people, two faculty members, Professor
Shudde and Professor Andrus and that was
basically it. In the Math Department, working
with the math chairmen, I had recruited Profes-
sors Read, Zehna, Woods, and Larsen. They
decided to come to the OR department and
work with me.
BOB SHELDON: Was that Professor Bob
Read that is just retiring?
JACK BORSTING: Yes. I recruited him. I
was doing a lot of recruiting in the Math De-
partment, because the two statisticians that
were here when I came had both left. One went
to San Francisco State and the other went to
Oregon State, so we had to recruit some new
statisticians. We got a good group and they
moved over to the OR Department which was
very helpful to me in building the department.
In fact, I went on the road and recruited Steve
Pollack at MIT, who stayed at the school for
about six years and then went to Michigan. I
also recruited Dave Schrady from CaseWestern
and he is still here. I recruited faculty from
Purdue, Claremont, and the University of Illi-
nois. Also, I didn’t know that much about op-
erations research and I had to pick it up on the
fly. I started going to MORS meetings at that
time and also started attending ORSA and
TIMS meetings as well.
BOB SHELDON: This is in 1964?
JACK BORSTING: Yes. I attended most of
the Society’s meetings. Also, there was a sum-
mer study I still remember the head of it, John
Craven. It was a Polaris Missile System study,
so I got myself involved in the study, which
was at the Naval Postgraduate School. It was
not originally involving the faculty at NPS, but
fortunately I was involved. I learned about op-
erations research by going to the various meet-
ings and doing a lot of reading.
BOB SHELDON: What about the early
MORS meetings?
JACK BORSTING: I went first to the Sym-
posium and met people. Then I was asked to be
on the Board of the Symposium. It wasn’t a
society at the time, so I said, “Sure, that would
be a good idea.” So I joined the MORS Board.
BOB SHELDON: What year was that?
JACK BORSTING: I’m not sure, it was
probably mid 1960s. Then being on the Board, I
got elected to be a Vice President. I can’t re-
member which VP. Then I was elected Presi-
dent and served as President in 1971 and 1972.
I was fairly active in MORS before I became
President and after I became President, I went
to the various symposiums, etc. It was an inter-
esting time because MORS was trying to stay
alive as is usually true with any fledgling orga-
nization. It hadn’t established itself, and you
had an Air Force, Army, and Navy sponsor,
and people were worried. “Will the Navy pull
out their funds? Will the Army keep sponsor-
ing?” There had to be a lot of work to keep the
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sponsors putting in funds to support the sym-
posiums.
BOB SHELDON: Who asked you to be a
MORS Director?
JACK BORSTING: It was somebody on
the Board and I can’t remember. I have to go
back and look at the people on the Board then.
I’m sure Tom Oberbeck, who I think was on the
Board helped me. Tom took a sabbatical after
he quit, and then came back and taught for a
while, but then he left again.
BOB SHELDON: Was he at the Naval
Postgraduate School?
JACK BORSTING: Yes. He died fairly
young. I’m sure he helped me. Even though I
replaced him, we had a very good relationship
because he knew that I wasn’t after his job. It
was a complete surprise to me. So I’m not sure
right now and I would have to go back and
look at the MORS Board at that time. Art Stein
was on the Board, but he wasn’t the one. I am
remembering some of the Presidents, but I’m
not remembering who might have asked me.
Anyway, I tried to get more faculty from the
Postgraduate School’s department active in
MORS by giving papers, and being on the
Board. When I went off the Board, there were
other NPS faculty members on the Board. I
think Dave Schrady was one of the first persons
I got to be on the MORS Board.
BOB SHELDON: Were the MORS Sympo-
sia well run?
JACK BORSTING: Yes. At any meeting,
you had some quality papers and you have
some papers that were not quality. That is true
of all the statistics meetings, the ORSA meet-
ings, the TIMS meetings, the MORS meetings,
etc. One of the reasons the quality of the papers
isn’t uniformly good is that people have to
present a paper to go to the meeting and they
are not refereed. Therefore you did have some
not so good papers, but you had some really
good papers. There were a few more plenary
type papers at that time, where various spon-
sors from the Army and Air Force and Navy
would give talks about what they were doing,
and that was very helpful to me.
BOB SHELDON: When you picked up
your Vice Presidential job in MORS, was that a
major demand on your schedule?
JACK BORSTING:Not really. I think I’m a
bit of a workaholic anyway. Also, most of the
work was building the OR Department. At the
same time, I was also active in ORSA. I got on
the Education Committee in ORSA, probably
because I was Chairman of the department
here. Charley Flagel an OR professor was the
chairman, and then I succeeded him as Chair of
the ORSA Education Committee. We did some
interesting things at that time. We started the
visiting lecture program, where we had profes-
sors available to go talk at other universities
that wanted an OR professional to speak. It was
my idea to start the program. I was in charge of
the program before I became Chairman of the
Education Committee of ORSA. And, of course,
we would also bring some military OR people
to talk. Then I became even more active in
ORSA. I ran for Council and was elected to the
ORSA Council for a three-year term. Then I got
asked to run for Secretary and I was elected as
Secretary of the Society. After my three-year
term as Secretary I was asked to run for Vice
President/President Elect and I got elected. So
my tenure on the ORSA Council was long. At
that time, the Past President served three more
years. So you were Vice President/President
Elect, President, and Past President, that was
five years. Then three years as Secretary and
three years as council member, 11 years in all.
BOB SHELDON: Did you see some of the
same people attending ORSA and MORS?
JACK BORSTING: Oh yes. At the same
time, I was involved in the Military Applica-
tions Section at ORSA. I guess the reason I got
involved with ORSA more than TIMS was be-
cause ORSA had more of the military OR peo-
ple involved. When ORSA and TIMS were
formed in the early days—I was told, I was not
there—but the military people went more to-
ward ORSA and the non-military or business
types went more toward TIMS. Not completely,
but most people were members of both. I was a
member of both, but I was much more active in
ORSA. Then when I became Vice President/
President Elect, we started a liaison between
the two and we got joint meetings and formed
a memorandum of understanding between
ORSA and TIMS, which led to the eventual
merger. Bob Oliver was President of ORSA at
the time I was President Elect. It did not make
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much sense to have two societies. I always
thought they should be merged. Then in my
year of presidency, the main thing I did was try
to consolidate the alliance that was made the
year before. So we consolidated—joint publica-
tions, joint meetings, but still had two separate
societies.
BOB SHELDON: What year did they con-
solidate?
JACK BORSTING: I was President of
ORSA in 1975–76, so the consolidation was in
1974–75. That was not a merger, but I call it an
alliance.
BOB SHELDON: Any other notable play-
ers that you worked with in the ORSAmeetings
that we would not know about in MORS?
JACK BORSTING: Well, there were a lot
of military people who had some activity in
MORS too. One was Joe Engel who was at CNA
for years and he was a military analyst. Of
course Morse and Kimball, some pioneers of
the field were active in ORSA. They also did
military OR work.
BOB SHELDON: For your people you
were paying to go to professional society meet-
ings like MORS and ORSA, how did you justify
the value of those meetings? Were the meetings
justified based on exposure and bringing back
new information?
JACK BORSTING: They presented pa-
pers, and all of the above reasons apply. First, it
was an outlet for classified communications
and second, it had fine working groups. The
working groups were very valuable to have
people in the same area working together over
a period of time. I always thought the working
groups were much more valuable than the
other sessions.
BOB SHELDON: Which working groups
did you go to in the early days of MORS?
JACK BORSTING: I can’t remember
which ones I went to quite candidly, but I al-
ways went to several groups. They had educa-
tion working groups too, so I went to those
because there were a lot of them in the early
days. I was trying to determine what a Military
Operations Research master’s degree program
should look like?
BOB SHELDON: We still have those dis-
cussions in MORS.
JACK BORSTING: Well, it’s not settled
yet. In the early days the Postgraduate School
program was an interdisciplinary program that
was mostly mathematics, computers and phys-
ics. When I came here, they had seven physics
courses in the curriculum. The present curricu-
lum doesn’t have any physics courses, which I
think is very unfortunate and a mistake. But
there will always be an argument on howmuch
theory and how much application. I still re-
member a discussion at a meeting, I don’t know
whether it was a MORS or ORSA session on
education, where Russ Ackoff from Case and
Ron Shepard from Berkeley were arguing. Ack-
off wanted all applications, Shepard wanted all
theory, and I thought they were both wrong,
and I told them so at the meeting. I said they
were not communicating because they were 180
degrees apart. The student should have a good
sound grounding in basic math, science and
engineering, and then you should try to teach
the art of model building and bridge the gap
between theory and applications. There were
very theoretical programs, like Berkeley’s and
Cornell’s. In the early days, Johns Hopkins had
a pretty good mix of both theory and applica-
tion. What I tried to do during my chairman-
ship of the department, and I was chairman
nine years, was to bridge the gap—have some
theory and then have applications at the end of
the program so that the student would have
some feeling of what model building and ap-
plied OR is all about. I emphasized this because
model building is really an art. Applied math-
ematics alone won’t do. But if you just have the
basic tools you can’t do it either. So that was the
philosophy of Monterey’s OR Department.
When I was Chairman, we still had some phys-
ics courses in the program, but less physics
courses than when we started, because I
thought we had too many physics courses. We
had to make room for other subjects, more com-
puter science, for example. We also had to
make room for some economics and human
engineering, human factors. We added human
engineering and human factors into our OR
program.
In fact, in the early days of the program,
there were some people who thought there
should be a separate systems analysis program
and a separate operations research program.
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Systems analysis and economic modeling was
being done by CNA. The OR techniques like
search theory, which the old OEG group of
CNA would do, was being called operations
research. Some individuals thought there
should be one program in systems analysis and
one program in operations research. I thought
that was crazy. We named the department the
Operations Analysis Department and called the
curriculum the Operations Research/Systems
Analysis Curriculum. We had all bases cov-
ered. I also hired economists to do the systems
analysis part. There was a conflict with some of
the economists who were hired in the manage-
ment group, who thought they should have a
special systems analysis program, but that was
never done, fortunately. The conflict was com-
pletely resolved in 1971. The OR Department
had grown from three people when I took it to
over 50. We had a large student body at that
time of OR students from all services and in-
ternational students. The then Provost, Milt
Clauser called me into his office and said, “Jack,
the Management group needs to be strength-
ened. It is not as strong as it should be. Since
you built the OR group into one of the best
departments in the country will you take over
the management group and build it?” So I said,
“Milt, I’m going to think about it and get back
to you.” So I came back to him and said, “No. I
would not do that, but if you want to merge the
two, I would use the OR excellence to build the
Management faculty.” He said, “Fine.” The two
departments were merged and I ended up with
a department of 85 people. This was in 1971. At
that time the department had 40% of the Post-
graduate School student body. We did increase
the quality of the Management group and then
in 1974, the Superintendent called me and said,
“We would like you to be the new Provost.”
Milt Clauser had retired and was ill unfortu-
nately, with a disease that was fatal. I said,
“Sure, I’ll be the Provost.” In about 1976 or 77,
I split the departments. Some of the faculty who
had been in one of the departments chose to
switch into the other department.
BOB SHELDON:Who was the head of the
OR department when you split them?
JACK BORSTING: The OR head was Dave
Schrady.
BOB SHELDON: For management, was
this an MBA style of management?
JACK BORSTING:No, it was a Master’s of
Science in Management. It was oriented to-
wards the Department of Defense. The curric-
ulum was a cross between a Master’s of Public
Administration and an MBA, but with an ori-
entation to defense. So it was called a Master’s
of Science in Management.
BOB SHELDON: Did they require a fair
amount of quantitative analysis?
JACK BORSTING: Yes. It was of course
more of a management program. It had some
system analysis/operations research, account-
ing, organizational behavior and some applied
statistics, but not to the depth that was in the
operations research program. The OR program
at that time was a two-year program and it had
a thesis attached to it. Management was an
18-month program at that time. They have all
been shortened now. In fact, the operations re-
search program had a very important compo-
nent. It had a six-week summer experience
tour. The student would go to a working OR
organization, like CNA, or some organization
in the Army, or in industry where they would
work on an OR problem. Many times that
would be their thesis problem. They would
come back to NPS and find a faculty advisor.
The students would also work with the applied
person whom they worked with during their
internship. About half the summer experience
tours resulted in theses. I felt that was a very
important part of the program, because most of
the students were not going on to obtain a
Ph.D. This was a terminal degree for them. The
program had a thesis requirement, which still
exists today. There is always the effort to cut it
out, but I think it is very, very important.
BOB SHELDON: Let me backtrack. When
you were active teaching, before you became a
department head, do you recall any of the the-
sis topics you supervised?
JACK BORSTING: I supervised many the-
ses. Most of these were probability modeling of
a military problem. I also supervised some clas-
sification/discriminant analysis theses, because
that was one of my research areas. In the early
days, about 1961, I had one student write a
random number generator for the CDC 1604
because there was none available.
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BOB SHELDON: What were your respon-
sibilities as a new Provost when you took on
that role?
JACK BORSTING:Mymain responsibility
as Provost was to get the school out of a deep
hole. The school student body around 1971 was
about 1800. There had been cuts in graduate
education by various organizations in Wash-
ington, including the Congress. When I took
over, the student body was 1200 and going
down. It went down to 900 in the next two
years. When I left the provost position in 1980
and went to Washington, the student popula-
tion was back to 1400. My job was to convince
OSD, the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, and
the Congress what a great institution NPS was
and how important graduate education was to
the future defense of the country. During this
time of a severely declining budget it was very
important to preserve the quality of the faculty.
During this period we did not fire any tenured
faculty. What we did was significantly increase
the amount of sponsored research. We did not
cut any faculty that we really wanted to keep.
We also increased the tenure and reappoint-
ment standards, which was good for the school.
Many faculty at that time were half-time re-
search and half-time teaching on a 12-month
basis. Some of them, on an academic year basis,
were half-time teaching, half-time research.
It was trying times, because we had every-
body in Washington, D.C. looking at us. In fact,
I was pleased that I reversed one cut from the
Senate Appropriations Committee. A former
faculty member here was working as a staffer
for the Senate Appropriations Committee; he
was working for Senator Brook of Massachu-
setts. We got Senator Brook to reverse a 10% cut
in the total number of graduate students across
all services. The cut was decreased to a 5% cut
and Brook weighed in because we gave him a
convincing argument on military human capi-
tal. It was a good argument. A lot of my time
was spent lobbying in Washington and keeping
the faculty happy and productive. I tried not to
let the faculty worry about the cuts. We kept a
lot of the details from the faculty because the
faculty’s job was to do their teaching and pub-
lish. If they started worrying too much, they
wouldn’t be productive. At the time I was told
by my Deans that I should have told the faculty
more of the problems, because the school was
in danger of being closed. During this period
Bill Clements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
appointed a blue ribbon committee of the ser-
vice Secretaries to evaluate Defense educational
programs. They looked at all the service insti-
tutions, war colleges, command and staff
schools, and graduate schools. He was con-
vinced until he came out with this group that
the school should close. Once he came out and
saw what was happening, he was a strong sup-
porter. The committee had a great staff. They
had two Rhodes scholars. The Air Force officer
Dave Rowe was a Rhodes’ scholar, Pete
Dawkins was the Army staffer and also a
Rhodes’ scholar. The Navy’s representative
was an OR graduate from Monterey. The staff-
ers for this study looked at all the service insti-
tutions before the committee made their visit.
We also had a Blue Ribbon Committee at that
time chaired by the Provost of Berkeley. Other
members of the committee were John Slaugh-
ter, the former director of NSF (National Sci-
ence Foundation) and Chancellor of the Univer-
sity of Maryland; Don Rice, the President of
RAND; Bill Perry and several engineering
Deans. They wrote a great report, which docu-
mented the uniqueness and quality of the
school. The report was used by the School for
many years. Most people who find out about
this institution are great supporters.
I attended someMORS Symposia and some
ORSA meetings when I was Provost. I didn’t
attend them all because I was pretty busy. Then
in 1976, when the Carter Administration came
in, Graham Claytor was the Secretary of the
Navy and Jim Woolsey was the Under Secre-
tary. I was offered the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Financial Management. I said, “No.”
My son was a senior in high school and I wasn’t
going to move. Then a couple of years later, Bill
Perry who was the Under Secretary for Acqui-
sition called and wanted me to be the Deputy
Under Secretary for 6.1 and 6.2. I called him
back a couple of days later and said, “Bill I’m
not enough of an engineer/scientist to do that
job well.” I thought I could do the job, but I
didn’t think it was right for me. Later Graham
Claytor became the Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, and I got a call from him to interview for
the Assistant Secretary Comptroller i.e., the
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Chief Financial Officer of the Department. Ha-
rold Brown offered me the job and I accepted.
In 1980, I went back to be the Assistant Secre-
tary (Comptroller) of the Defense Department.
When the Reagan Administration came on I
was reappointed by the Reagan Administra-
tion, so I was able to stay in the Comptroller’s
job for a while. In 1981, MORS awarded me the
Wanner Award and had me be the plenary
speaker at the 47th MORS Symposium in Wash-
ington, D.C. The title of my talk was “Defense
Decision Making”. The talk was later published
in the TIMS Journal. That was my last MORS
Symposium for a while. When I left the Penta-
gon in 1983, I went to be Dean of the Business
School at the University of Miami. I left Miami
in 1988 to become Dean of the Business School
at the University of Southern California.
When Robert McNamara was Secretary of
Defense, he had Charles Hitch as his Assistant
Secretary Comptroller. In the early 60s, the Pro-
gram and Analysis group and the Comptroller
were in one office. Charlie Hitch had responsi-
bility for both sides. Sometime later the organi-
zation was broken up and the Program and
Analysis group was separated from the Comp-
troller. When I became the Comptroller in 1980,
that was the case. I worked very close with the
Program and Analysis people. The Comptroller
shop, when I took over, was just involved with
the budget part, and I thought that this was
wrong. I wanted to be involved with the plan-
ning, the programming and the budget. There-
fore, I created a small new group and asked
Mike Sovereign who was NPS OR professor to
head the group. Mike’s group was doing what
I would call liaison between the planning phase
and the programming phase. One of the people
that was hired for this shop was Steve Balut
who was a Naval officer at the time and who
was the first Ph.D. in Operations Research
granted by the Naval Postgraduate School. The
group helped me to bridge the gap between the
planning, the programming, and the budget
phases. What I was hoping for was that my
budget staff would get more involved in the
entire PPBS process.
When Secretary Weinberger testified in
Congress I was always with him. He had the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who at that time
was David Jones, on one side and me on the
other. He was asked questions about the plan-
ning phase, the programming phase, etc., not
just the budget phase. I had to know about the
entire process. Initially, my staff would give me
just a briefing book on the budget numbers.
The new group was very important for me
when I testified as the Comptroller and when I
assisted the Secretary.
BOB SHELDON: Did your Operations Re-
search background help you in doing that?
JACK BORSTING: Oh yes. The Opera-
tions Research background really helped and
so did my math education, because I was able
to do back of the envelope analysis very
quickly. My staff would bring me papers. I
would look at the paper and I would look at the
answer, and sometimes I would say, “This is
wrong.” “Well, how can you tell it’s wrong?” I
said, “I know it’s wrong.” I just did a rough
calculation. Now, I did not do any linear pro-
gramming or queueing theory or any sophisti-
cated analysis, but I did do a lot of what you
might call back of the envelope analysis. Of
course, I had my special projects staff with
Mike and Steve and they did some analysis
when it was appropriate. I used the analysis
that first Russ Murray’s shop did under the
Harold Brown administration, and then with
David Chu under Secretary Weinberger. I used
a lot of their analysis because I didn’t want to
duplicate it. There is now an Under Secretary
and PA&E is back in the Comptroller shop. The
analysis in the Comptroller shop that I person-
ally did was very basic. When I left the Penta-
gon and went to Miami, I was fortunate in
being able to keep active in the defense analysis
because I was asked to be a Trustee of the
Center for Naval Analyses, CNA. I was on the
CNA Board for 12 years; and I also was on the
Aerospace Corporation Board, which is a sys-
tems engineering organization that does work
in the AF space program. I was on the Aero-
space Board until I went on the Northrop
Grumman Board in 1991. I was asked to be on
the IDA Board and I became an IDA trustee and
just went off the board last March. I concur-
rently served on the CNA Board, the IDA
Board and the Aerospace Board. I was really
keeping my hands involved in defense even
though I was a professor in a business school.
Steve Balut at IDA has, in my view, built the
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premier cost analyses group in this country. He
has had an informal review group that was
composed of me, Mike Sovereign, and one
other trustee. We would meet a couple of times
a year and review the Division’s programs.
When Jack Vessey was the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, he wanted a JCS force planning
model developed. IDA was chosen as the con-
tractor. The program developed included a cost
model, an effectiveness model, and an integra-
tion model. The program had an outside inde-
pendent review panel. The members were Gen-
eral Donald Bennett, USA, retired; General
Russell Dougherty USAF, retired; Admiral
Harry Train, USN, retired; and me. I was on the
Board of Northrop Grumman for ten years. We,
of course, were doing analysis, but at a high
level. It was very interesting to watch Northrop
Grumman go from a six billion dollar corpora-
tion to a 29 billion dollar corporation over time.
BOB SHELDON: What did you contribute
to those boards? What kind of advice do you
give?
JACK BORSTING: I’ve served on about
eight public company boards, several nonprofit
and also some private company boards. Many
of the boards have had me chair the audit com-
mittee. I’m not sure that’s been my major con-
tribution, as I have been on other committees.
At Northrop Grumman, I was on the nominat-
ing and corporate governance committee, the
audit committee and the compensation com-
mittee. I chaired the nominating committee for
seven years. I believe my main contribution on
all the boards I have been on was to be able to
look at the strategic direction of the company
and when the company had problems, to cut
through all the chaff and get to the heart of the
issue. My mathematics and analysis training
enable me to get rid of the extraneous informa-
tion and formulate the issues in simple terms.
BOB SHELDON: Can you give an example
of the specific problems you found or helped
with?
JACK BORSTING: At Northrop Grum-
man I worked with the CEO and a former
Monterey OR graduate, Jim Roche, to change
the strategic direction of the company and em-
phasize systems integration and electronic war-
fare more than airplane building. That is one
example.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How did you go
about looking at those? Was it like seeing prob-
lems through analysis or were they more of a
discussion of where you think you want to go?
JACK BORSTING: Well, both. The corpo-
ration would do some work and present the
alternatives to the board and then the board
would ask questions. There are always a lot of
extraneous issues around, which is normal in a
meeting of this kind. The important thing is to
get rid of these issues and say, “This is what we
should really focus on. This is the key issue.” I
am a believer that for boards of companies their
primary job is two-fold. One, is to hire and fire
the CEO and two, is to help the CEO and senior
staff set a strategic direction for the company. I
have been involved in firing CEOs, but we
won’t go into details here.
BOB SHELDON: Later you went on to
head other university business schools. How
would you view those schools as compared to
your experience at the Naval Postgraduate
School?
JACK BORSTING: The faculty at NPS was
easier to work with than the faculties at the
other schools. The other schools weren’t hard to
work with, but the faculty at NPS was more
focused on the mission of the institution and as
a result was a little easier to work with.
BOB SHELDON: Were those departments
already established when you got there?
JACK BORSTING: I was hired by the Uni-
versity of Miami to build the Business School.
We had to increase the quality of the faculty
and the students. Also, we had to raise money.
One of the jobs of the Dean of any private
business school or any business school is to
raise money from alumni, business leaders, and
foundations. In Miami, I spent about half my
time raising money. They had no endowed
chairs. When I left there were six endowed
chairs. We did not have a business affiliate
program, which is a program to bridge the gap
between the business school and industry.
When I left, we had 110 corporate affiliates who
paid certain amounts of money to the school
each year. At USC, which had a more estab-
lished business school with a better reputation,
it turned out my main mission was to sort out
the financial mess I inherited. I won’t go into
detail, but the school was spending money it
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did not have. For a business school, it did not
have a good financial system. None of the de-
partments had budgets. The entire decision
making was done at the Dean level. Obviously,
this does not work when you have over 4,000
students and about 190 faculty. To have all the
small decisions made at the Dean’s office made
no sense at all. As a result, the school was
spending too much money. I had to straighten
things out financially, and then we continued to
build the quality of the faculty and students
and raise more money. We were really able to
increase the quality of the students at USC. The
full-time MBA student average GMAT score
was around 580 when I got there. After six
years when I left the Deanship it was around
630 and my successor continued to increase the
scores to over 700.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: So you found a
better process of bringing good students in?
JACK BORSTING: Yes.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Was it easier to
teach those higher quality students?
JACK BORSTING: Oh yes. The under-
graduates at USC were not of as high quality as
the graduate students. The present President
significantly increased the quality of the under-
graduate student body. The average SAT’s at
University of Southern California were about
1085 when he arrived. Now they are about 1340
and of the other research universities in the
western United States, there are only two that
are higher, Stanford and Cal Tech. It is much
nicer to teach brighter students.
BOB SHELDON: You still have, via your
former students and people you worked with
under Weinberger’s group, some close contacts
with current officials in the Department of De-
fense. How do you feel about the current trends
in the Department of Defense regarding using
analysis to make good sound decisions?
JACK BORSTING: The status of analysis
has changed over the years, depending on the
Secretary of Defense and how the Secretary
wanted to use the analysis. It is my impression
that Mr. Rumsfeld is really using analysis to
help him make decisions. The services have
also gone through cycles. I think the Navy, as
Admiral Tracey said in the Plenary Session, is
building up their in-house analysis group. Cer-
tainly it has changed from the days of Mc-
Namara when analysis was used a lot. Then,
with various other Secretaries it wasn’t used as
much, and I believe now it is being used more.
BOB SHELDON:What do you see as indi-
cations of that?
JACK BORSTING: Knowing Rumsfeld’s
background and talking to people. Also, being
on the Board of IDA I saw that the number of
studies that were funded increased.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: I’m sure in your
analyses, you ended up doing a little teaching
or perhaps providing little bit of education to
the decision maker to help them better under-
stand your studies.
JACK BORSTING:Well, it depends on the
individual and their background. You know,
Rumsfeld was a trustee of the RAND Corpora-
tion for years. So he was involved in an over-
view of the RAND Corporation’s analyses. I’m
sure, his background influenced his feeling of
analysis and also at the time he was a former
Secretary of Defense. Harold Brown was a
quantitative type who definitely appreciated
analysis. So I think most of the Secretaries have
an appreciation of analysis already. There is
probably more constant use of analysis at the
OSD level than the service level. That is my
estimate from afar at this point in time.
BOB SHELDON: When you return to the
Naval Postgraduate School, how do you see the
Postgraduate School OR Department changing
since you left years ago?
JACK BORSTING: That’s an interesting
question. I think there should be a physics
course or two in the present curriculum, partic-
ularly for naval officers who are going to do
ASW analysis. The program when you com-
pare it to programs at civilian universities
stacks up very well. It has a good mix of theory
and applications, but I would like to see a bit
more applications. Most Operations Research
programs in civilian universities, in my view,
lean too much towards applied mathematics.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You mentioned
physics particularly for submariners.
JACK BORSTING:Not just for the subma-
riners, but even for air and surface officers. If
you are modeling a physical environment you
should have a little feel for the physics of the
situation. The course should not be a standard
physics course, but should emphasize model
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building. In my view physics is just model
building. That is not usually how physics pro-
fessors teach their courses.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How do you help
professors become better? Taking on challenges
in the classroom or introducing topic discus-
sions? I’m sure you had an influence on how
things turned out in the classroom or fostered
research directions.
JACK BORSTING: Well, it’s very difficult
to lead professors. One of my colleagues, War-
ren Bennis, has said in his books, “Leading
professors is like trying to herd cats”. One of
the things I did do as Chairman of the OR
Department and as Provost, was to encourage
faculty to spend time at laboratories or in the
Pentagon. I thought that would be very good
for their career. Dick Elster, for example, had
two tours in Washington—one in the Navy and
one in OSD. Other faculty have gone to Wash-
ington and various government labs. Some
have stayed, which is unfortunate for the Post-
graduate School, but is still good for the De-
fense Department. It was easier to do it here
than it was at the University of Southern Cali-
fornia and the University of Miami, but I think
it would be good for the faculty to work in
industry for a while, particularly in a profes-
sional school, like a business school. I think that
engineering schools and business schools have
become too theoretical in their programs. The
theory is very important, but you have to have
a mix. You have to be able to somehow bridge
the gap between theory and applications. This
is particularly true at the master’s level where
you are giving a professional terminal degree.
At most civilian universities, they are really
interested in the Ph.D. The master’s degree
many times is the consolation prize if the per-
son is going towards a doctorate.
BOB SHELDON: Do you have any hobbies
outside of doing your University work and
your mathematics?
JACK BORSTING:Well, I should mention
that I have gotten much more interested in pro
bono activities. I am on the Orthopedic Hospi-
tal Board of Los Angeles, which is a private,
hospital specializing in orthopedics. I chaired
the foundation board for two years and then
chaired the board of the hospital for three
years. I am still working for Orthopedic Hospi-
tal. The hospital provides free care for many
children who do not have insurance. I am cur-
rently on the Army Science Board. I am also on
the Board of the Rose Hills Foundation, which
has a 380 million dollar endowment that sup-
ports gifts to charities in the Southern Califor-
nia area, particularly the greater San Gabriel
Valley. It is very satisfying to help the less
fortunate. As far as other hobbies, I play a little
golf, although my back limits the amount. I
play some tennis and I like to read.
BOB SHELDON: Your selected reading
material, is it technical or non-technical?
JACK BORSTING:Non-technical—mostly
mystery novels.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Please mention a
few of your mentors?
JACK BORSTING: I’ve been asked that
question before and it’s a hard question for me
to answer. Over the years I picked up different
things from people I worked with, but I would
not say that I have had any mentors. For exam-
ple, one of the Superintendents at the Postgrad-
uate School, Bob McNitt, would write hand-
written notes to people on special occasions. I
have done the same thing ever since. His sec-
retary classified him as having a velvet ham-
mer. (Laughs) I have tried to be smooth in deal-
ing with people, but also firm. I try to listen to
them and deal with them in a fair way. There
are lots of people I have learned from. My
statistics professors, who showed me how they
approach problems, mentored me in that way.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: I’ve always been
influenced by some teacher in the classroom,
someone who was generally enthusiastic about
a topic. Could be a math professor? Do you
have a few of those?
JACK BORSTING: Well, certainly, in
graduate school. I had one of the most disorga-
nized teachers you could find, but he was very
good and was the chairman of the department.
I learned a lot from him. He really made me
think. Then I had another professor who was
the best expositor I have ever had. He taught
me number theory and advanced algebra. He
was the smoothest teacher I have ever seen, and
yet I am not sure I learned as much from him as
I did from the other individual, who taught me
advanced calculus and complex variability the-
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ory. I learned from both of them, but they were
very different.
The following transcript is from the MORS
Heritage Session at the 72nd MORS Symposium
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, 23 June 2004.
INTRODUCTION: Each year as part of the
MORS annual symposium distinguished
speakers are invited to provide their thoughts
and comments on the development of Opera-
tion Research during their early years as ana-
lysts, educators, study directors, or analytical
agency leaders. The presentations they make
and the discussions that follow are based on
their unique experiences in OR and the wealth
of knowledge about our historical past. This
year at our MORS Symposium, Mr. Eugene
Visco, as Chairman of the 72nd Heritage Session
and Mr. Lee Dick, the Chairman of the Heritage
Committee have brought together two of our
finest and most senior colleagues to discuss
early OR and the significant events and inter-
esting occurrences that took place “on their
watch.” Today we are pleased to have Dean
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., of the Naval Postgradu-
ate School (NPS) and Dr. Jack R. Borsting,
former Dean of Academics and Provost of NPS
to address this session.
LEE DICK: First I’d like to thank Gene
Visco here for lining up our Heritage speakers
for today. We had three icons in our profession
who were lined up; unfortunately one of those,
Phil Depoy, could not be with us. He is taking
care of his wife who has lung cancer. But we do
have two with us today. And they have a lot of
commonality between them. They are both
MORS Past Presidents, both MORS Fellows,
both distinguished faculty and both deans of
the Naval Postgraduate School. I’ll start off
with Dr. Borsting here. He was the former Dean
of Academics and Provost; in fact, I believe he
was Provost when I was a student here. He left
then to become OSD Comptroller for Presidents
Carter and Reagan. He’s now Professor Emeri-
tus at the Marshall School at the University of
Southern California. So, Dr. Borsting.
JACK BORSTING: I don’t think Wayne
and I have prepared remarks. We’d like to talk
a bit and get the audience talking with us,
which would be much better than giving a dry
lecture. Anybody with spitballs stay in the
back. {Laughter} I’ll correct one thing in the
introduction. You said Professor Emeritus at
USC; it’s Dean Emeritus. I’m still a professor at
the University of Southern California, so I’m
not quite put out to pasture yet. Soon maybe,
but not yet.
It’s too bad Phil wasn’t here for this heri-
tage session because I believe Phil goes back in
OR history further than either of us. But we’ll
try to pick it up, right Wayne?
WAYNE HUGHES: Phil is a dear friend
with wonderful recollections.
JACK BORSTING: I told Gene Visco I
would not have any prepared remarks and
would like to take questions from the audience
and he said, “Well, just talk about the early
days of OR and when you were Comptroller
and what analysis took place during this pe-
riod.” So that’s what I will do.
I got into the field of Operations Research
in a very unusual way. I came to the Postgrad-
uate School in 1959, as assistant professor of
mathematics and was mainly interested in
teaching probability and statistics. The OR pro-
gram was one of the reasons I came here, but
there was no OR department at the time. A few
years later one of the professors in the mathe-
matics department who was active in OR, in
fact the program was being run by two profes-
sors of mathematics and one professor of phys-
ics, talked the hierarchy of the Postgraduate
School into creating an OR department. The
only individual who transferred into the OR
department at the time was Tom Oberbeck who
became the Chair. Tom recruited a couple of
their people, but I stayed in the math depart-
ment. In 1964, Tom got into a fight with the
administration and quit. The Superintendent,
the President of the Postgraduate School, called
me into his office and said, “I’d like you to
become the chairman of the OR department.” I
thought the OR program was great, but I was
still an associate professor and pretty young at
the time. So I said, “Well how long do I have to
make up my mind.” He said, “24 hours”. So I
spent a lot of time talking to people and came in
and said, “Yes, I’d do it”. And that started my
OR career. I had to learn more about OR in a
short period of time, so I started going to MORS
meetings and also to ORSA meetings. In fact,
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the first summer I was chairman, the Polaris
Program was running a summer study pro-
gram at NPS. Any of you remember John Cra-
ven? It’s probably too far back. John was in
charge of the study, and so I became a member
of the study team. I got involved with MORS,
and this was a very good thing—because I
became a Director of MORS and then a Vice
President in 1971. In 1972, I became the Presi-
dent of MORS, and I was also active in ORSA
and became the President of ORSA in 1975–
1976. I learned a lot about Operations Research
by participating in various working groups at
MORS.
I really wasn’t involved in the early days of
OR (Just after World War II). Maybe one of my
former students was, Wayne Hughes, he’s a bit
older you see. Were you involved in World
War II, Wayne?
It’s too bad we’re talking about heritage
days and we don’t have some people that were
involved in the forties and fifties. Some of the
people are still alive, like Joe Engel and others
who were involved in starting ORSA and TIMS
in the early 1950’s. I came into the field in 1964.
One of my early students in the probability and
statistics courses I taught was Wayne Hughes.
What year did you start the OR program at
NPS?
WAYNE HUGHES: Nineteen sixty-two.
JACK BORSTING: Wayne came as a stu-
dent in 1962 and I had him for several classes
because there weren’t very many OR professors
at the time. It was a difficult environment to
recruit OR professors. The OR program at
Monterey, which started way back in about
1951, was basically physics, mathematics and
computer science. In fact, when I came it had
seven physics courses. I don’t think it has any
physics courses in the program now? (True:
Wayne). I think it should have some physics
courses—Wave Theory, et cetera, so that ana-
lysts can appreciate the physical phenomenon
they are modeling.
Of the professors we recruited, most had
degrees in other fields besides Operations Re-
search because many of the Operations Re-
search programs were just starting. Case West-
ern Reserve University (formerly Case Institute
of Technology) started an early OR Ph.D. pro-
gram and one of the early recruits in the de-
partment was Dave Schrady. Dave had his Doc-
torate from Case Western in Operations
Research. But some of the other early recruits,
Bob Read, who is here earned his degree in
Probability and Statistics from UC Berkeley.
And Mike Sovereign who is also in the audi-
ence has a Ph.D. in Economics from the Uni-
versity of Illinois. Mike and Bob were early
recruits who worked to develop the OR pro-
gram. The OR program evolved into a mix of
theory and applications. Are there any other
OR professors here?
RUSS RICHARDS: I came in 1970.
JACK BORSTING: In 1964, when I was
lucky enough to become Chairman, the depart-
ment had three faculty members including my-
self. A year later, the Probability and Statistics
faculty moved over from the math department.
The Provost in 1970 decided that he wanted to
do something with the management group. We
were 50 faculty in the OR department and the
Provost merged the two departments. The De-
partment of Operations Research and Admin-
istrative Sciences had 85 faculty members. So I
had 85 faculty members as a department chair.
In 1974, I was fortunate to be selected as the
Provost. When I became Provost, I wasn’t do-
ing very much OR.
Gene wanted me to talk about when I was
in the Pentagon and what OR was like there. I
was in the Pentagon from 1980 through 1982.
At the time the PA&E and Comptroller shops
were separate as I believe all of you might
remember. They started out under one boss
when Charlie Hitch was the Assistant Secretary
(Comptroller) with PA&E and the Budget shop
under him. I think that is the way it should be,
and I believe it’s that way now. Well, when I
came as Comptroller most of my, in fact all of
my people were budget people. We were just
looking at the end game, i.e. the budget part of
the PPBS system. We didn’t get involved in the
planning or the programming phase. There was
not any analysis done in the Comptroller’s
shop, so when I came into the position I de-
cided it would be a good idea to do some
analysis. I was appointed the Comptroller
when Harold Brown was the Secretary of De-
fense. Harold testified by himself. I would give
him a report and the next day it was back on
my desk with handwritten comments. He had
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read the whole report. He just wouldn’t read
the Executive Summary I wrote. Secretary
Weinberger operated much differently. I was in
his office every morning at nine o’clock for a
staff meeting and whenever he testified, no
matter where he testified, he had the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs on his left and me on the
right. He was asked not just budget questions
but analysis questions, programming ques-
tions, and planning questions. Initially, my staff
would just give me the budget numbers. I cre-
ated a special project group to do my own
analysis. I was fortunate in getting Mike Sover-
eign to come to Washington, DC and head that
group. You (Mike) should really be up here
talking. Mike Sovereign was in this group
along with Joe Kammerer and Steve Balut.
Steve Balut, who is sitting in the back of the
room, was the OR department’s first Ph.D. The
group performed some analysis that helped me
and made the budget types a little broader.
Mike, you observed the system. Did I make the
budget staff look a little more across the spec-
trum in the PPBS system?
MIKE SOVEREIGN: Oh yes. I think they
did.
JACK BORSTING: The staff in the Comp-
troller’s organization always made changes in
the “end game” just before the budget was
submitted to Congress. If the staff didn’t think
something was a good thing to do, they would
try to cut it out at the last minute in the budget
process. We were able to do a bit more analysis
and contribute to the planning and budget
phases. By the way, I should mention one thing;
I played the “end game” once as Comptroller.
The nuclear submariners in the Navy wanted to
cut out all of the diesel submarines. Any sub-
mariners here? No? Okay. Well, we had done
enough analysis at Postgraduate School to
show that diesel submarines had some benefit
to the Navy. One reason, in certain barrier op-
erations they were very quiet and hard to de-
tect. They were quieter than nuclear powered
ships when on battery. Also many of the coun-
tries around the globe had diesel submarines.
And so the Navy, in our view, my view in
particular, should have some diesels in the
fleet. When I was Comptroller we’d saved the
diesel submarines from being decommissioned.
I went to Claytor, the Deputy Secretary and he
said, “I agree with you, Jack”, and so they
continued to be in the fleet. After I left, the last
diesel submarine was removed from the force. I
believe this was good use of the analysis per-
formed at the Postgraduate School. It was play-
ing the budget “end game,” but I believe it was
positive for our force structure.
So we really didn’t do, in the Comptroller
shop, a great amount of analysis. Mike’s shop
did some. We also tried to get mission budget-
ing in, didn’t we Mike? We let some steady
contracts that would assist us in moving to-
ward mission budgeting.
MIKE SOVEREIGN: Relating R&D back to
the mission.
JACK BORSTING: Yes, relating R&D back
in the mission, and we tried to do some things
to streamline the process and make it more
relevant.
UNKNOWN: In that example for the sub-
marines, were there analysis shops that were
saying this versus that? That you were doing
and comparing results to, or were they separate
camps? Or did analysis happen at all in the
submarine crowd?
JACK BORSTING: I do not remember all
the details. But I believe the submariners did
their own analysis. In 1980, 1981, and 1982, the
submariners had a lot of control over the entire
Navy.
UNKNOWN: Yes, Admiral Rickover was
still in power then.
JACK BORSTING: Admiral Rickover, yes.
The kindly gentleman was still wielding his
power. So I’m not sure how much analysis was
done except that nuclear submarines were ob-
viously better than diesels. And, of course, in
most respects they are.
UNKNOWN: I was on a field assignment
at the time. In exercises; they used to force the
diesels to snorkel. Otherwise, they just would
shoot the submarine; the Navy didn’t want to
hear that.
JACK BORSTING: You couldn’t hear
them and so that was one thing. Any other
questions about analysis on the Comptroller’s
side?
UNKNOWN: Yes. Were you involved at all
in the analysis or anything in bringing back the
battleships?
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JACK BORSTING: Yes. We brought back
the battleships, but I wasn’t personally in-
volved in the decision. I should mention it was
quite a shift between the days of Harold Brown
and the days of Cap Weinberger. When I was
interviewed for the Comptroller job by Harold
Brown I said, “It seems to me that you’re cen-
tralizing power in the Secretary’s office. The
Secretary is making a lot of decisions on what
systems are going to be funded versus what
happened under the Laird/Packard era. I think
you’re going back to the McNamara days”. He
smiled at me and said, “You’re right, Jack”. I
said, “Do you think that’s really a good idea?”
So we argued for a while. As I walked out of the
room I said to myself, “There goes that job”.
But two days later I got a call, “The White
House wants to talk to you”. It was the White
House patching Brown in, he went through the
White House switch. He got me at home and
offered me the job and I said, “Yes”. I guess my
questioning the Secretary was a good strategy.
Speaking of other analysis, maybe some of
you could help on this. This was also the time
that the B-1B came into play. My staff analysis
was that it was not cost effective to modify the
B-1. The politics of the time was that the Reagan
administration wanted a major weapons sys-
tem in the eight years they were in power and
they chose the B-1B. So the decision was made
to go ahead with the modified B-1 even though
the B-2 was on the drawing board and being
built. In fact, it was very interesting because I
had to go and testify before Congress about the
costs of the B-1B before the Armed Services
Committee, and Senator Levin was not a
friendly questioner. Just before I was supposed
to go over to the hill I went into Secretary
Carlucci’s office with Dave Chu and I said,
“What are the costs? I have to testify in one
hour”. And they said, “We don’t know, just
dance”. This is what Carlucci told me. I went to
the hill with my dancing shoes and confused
Senator Levin. I gave him cost numbers in ’80,
’81, ’82 constant dollars and played the confu-
sion game. He got very confused, but I couldn’t
do anything else because we didn’t know the
official cost numbers.
UNKNOWN: I was very interested that
you worked the transition not just between ad-
ministrations but from a Democrat to a Repub-
lican who more or less ran against that admin-
istration. How were you able to gain the
confidence of the decision makers you were
supporting with analysis after the transition?
JACK BORSTING: First, I was the Comp-
troller, more of a professional position. Second,
I came in late in the administration. Third, I was
a Republican from California. I was the only
cabinet or sub-cabinet appointee that got reap-
pointed in the same position. The Reagan peo-
ple wanted everybody out that had been
appointed by Carter as a presidential appoint-
ment. It turned out that Cap Weinberger and
Frank Carlucci asked about my work, and de-
cided they wanted to keep me. What I didn’t
know for sure was if I could stay. They
wouldn’t accept my resignation, they out
waited the White House and I was reappointed
in October 1981. I believe they wanted some-
body with some continuity and they heard I
was unbiased.
There’s an interesting story after Harold
Brown offered me the job. A week later a White
House person in the Defense Department called
me up and said, “You know we need some
paperwork to get you through the White House
and then confirmed by the Congress”. And he
said, “By the way we didn’t ask you what your
party was”. I said, “Well, I’m a registered Re-
publican”. He said, “Oh ****”. After a pause he
said, “Harold Brown doesn’t care but if the
White House cares would you change your
party?” I said, “That’s the White House’s prob-
lem, not my problem”. So that gives you a little
background. I believe you shouldn’t really have
a political person as Comptroller because I
dealt with OMB and various congressional
committees on the budget. I testified before
appropriations committees, both House and
Senate both Armed Services Committees and
the Congressional Budget Committee. I tried to
be the honest broker in my testimony. Of
course, I couldn’t testify against the administra-
tion’s position and go around the administra-
tion’s positions. Some political appointees do,
and I believed this is not professional. I didn’t
think we should have a B-1B bomber, but I
wasn’t going to argue against it in public.
Therefore I argued for it, if I felt that I couldn’t
do that, I should quit the job. Pure and simple.
INTERVIEW OF JACK BORSTING, FS
Military Operations Research, V11 N2 2006 Page 73
UNKNOWN: When you were testifying in
front of Congress, did they brief you in advance
as to what they were going to ask you or did
they ever blindside you with questions?
JACK BORSTING: Your staff tried to brief
you but you were nearly always blindsided. In
fact, in my confirmation hearing, they briefed
me on questions that Senator Levin and other
members might ask me. There were only three
Senators in attendance at the Armed Service
Committee when I was confirmed. Senator
Exxon from Nebraska chaired it; Senator Levin
and Senator Warner were there. Senator Exxon
turned to Levin and Levin’s first question was,
“Do you have a brother named Billy?” (Laugh-
ter) Now how do you answer that? You know
with Billy Carter in the news. Should I be flip-
pant? I decided I’d better not be flippant. So I
said, “Senator I have no brothers or sisters”.
And Exxon turned to Levin and said, “You’re
out of order”. The question and answer did not
appear in the Congressional record. Senator
Levin proceeded to ask me questions that my
staff didn’t brief me on. They were obscure
detailed financial questions that I couldn’t an-
swer. I said I would answer them for the
record, which I did. Your staff could never
prepare you for all the questions.
The first time I testified with Secretary
Weinberger was on the ’82 budget and the ’81
supplement. Joe Addabo was quite a character;
he was the chairman of the committee. Jamie
Witten was the chairman of the overall appro-
priations committee. Jamie came in the room
and Addabo stopped and said, “I know you’re
busy Chairman Witten, but would you like to
ask Secretary Weinberger some questions?”
“Yes” he said. And then he said, “Mr. Secretary,
I’ve been listening to you now for the last ten
minutes and you know you’re just like Mr.
McNamara, you haven’t said a damn thing”.
Now, he really hit Weinberger because Wein-
berger didn’t think that much of McNamara,
and he also said he didn’t say a damn thing.
This was his first time on the hill. Then Witten
proceeded to ask a question and I wasn’t sure
what the question was. Weinberger turned to
me for the answer and I gave him a piece of
paper. I said, “1981 supplemental or 1982?” He
really didn’t know either, so he wrote me back
a little note saying ’47. That was when Witten
was elected to the Congress for the first time.
Some of you may have known Derrick
Vandershaft who became the Defense Depart-
ment IG. He was a senior staffer on House
Appropriations and would write the questions
and then sit behind the members and point his
finger to help the Congressman read the ques-
tions. So it was an interesting time testifying.
We did not worry about not knowing the an-
swers to all the questions. You worked with
your staff to prepare. But the Congressmen or
Senators always asked you questions you
weren’t prepared for. Fortunately, the answer
could be provided for the record.
UNKNOWN: Totally different question
and maybe give us a chance to move into an-
other arena. What kind of a student was he
[Wayne Hughes]?
WAYNE HUGHES:Wait a minute, I’ve got
a rebuttal.
JACK BORSTING: I was just going to in-
troduce Wayne before we got off on these other
questions because in the early days of the Op-
erations Research program I got to teach a lot.
When I moved up in the hierarchy and the OR
Department got larger I didn’t get to know the
students as well as I would have liked. Work-
ing with the students was always a real plea-
sure, in fact in the early days I was almost the
same age as the students. So I attended a lot of
student parties and Wayne was always there.
WAYNE HUGHES: Wait a minute, what’s
the party connection?
JACK BORSTING: Wayne was a very
thoughtful student who was always thinking
about military applications and what he could
do with the course material. Wayne, I think I
had you in several Probability and Statistics
courses.
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes. You did.
JACK BORSTING: We kept in touch over
the years. And I believe one of the reasons
Wayne is at the Postgraduate School is because
of my recommending he return as a military
professor.
LEE DICK: Before you start, just a couple
of tidbits of information. First of all, Wayne is a
former Navy Captain, a 1952 Naval Academy
graduate, commanded the Minesweeper Hum-
mingbird and Destroyer Morton, had some re-
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ally outstanding OR tours including OP 96, the
analysis division on Chief of Naval Operations
staff, and at SACLANT. And then came here in
1979 as a faculty member. And I think his first,
if I recall right, your first thesis student was
Vice Admiral Pat Tracey. But after that, the
thesis students kind of went downhill. A couple
years later there was this kook that came up
with an idea of doing a campaign analysis with
the Seaplane full of fighters that he was a thesis
advisor for.
WAYNE HUGHES: That’s right. Lee Dick
was my thesis student and maybe we collabo-
rated on the most outrageous idea even I still
think and Lee still thinks it is a good idea. It
was a Seaplane out of which fighter aircraft
flew. Max Platzer, the Chairman of the Aero
Engineering Department at the time, swears
that Lockheed Martin had patents on this idea
and they were going to fly them out of a C-5. So
it was a C-5 sized aircraft but it was a Navy
Seaplane instead of a USAF land plane. And we
probably would have gone from 700,000
pounds up to a million pounds because that
was feasible. And about that point you want to
go on the water because the weight was getting
too big for a land plane. Max said it was pos-
sible to launch and land aircraft, and recover
them in the air. And Lee did a careful cost
effectiveness analysis. There is a lot of money in
a carrier battle group so it’s not too hard to
show, expensive as a Seaplane would be to
develop and procure, you could get the equiv-
alent capability for less cost by going in the air.
And of course you will get the combat capabil-
ity on scene much more quickly. One could
have built a missileer or a scout, and on and on.
But a seaplane carrier was too far out of the box
for the Navy or even the Air Force to pick up
on. I still remember that effort fondly and the
spectacularly careful work that Lee did on that
thesis. Pat Tracey had a neat thesis, too. It was
done on a hand held calculator. She “fired” a
spread of missiles and calculated the probabil-
ity of one or more hits. When the trajectory of
the missiles is uncertain, when your own loca-
tion is uncertain, and when there’s an uncer-
tainty of the target location. Neat little piece of
work.
So much for that. Let me make a few more
connections with Jack. Jack and Mike Sovereign
and Ty Dedman, who was the Superintendent
at that time, all walked into my office saying,
“Why don’t you come to work at the Postgrad-
uate School?” And I’m sitting there thinking,
“Throw me into that briar patch.” Jack was one
of my professors during my first quarter at NPS
in 1962. He had a magic touch. His blackboard
demonstrations were the most God-awful
scrawl you ever imagined but you could just
smell that he wanted to communicate, so he
had this personal touch with me and I think the
other students as well. I’d been out of the Naval
Academy for ten years so getting back into
math was tough for me. But as I got into it
things got easier. Toward the end of the pro-
gram we had some electives. I thought to my-
self, “What is it that I know the least about that
I will never pick up again if I don’t learn it
here?” That was clearly statistics. So I signed up
for advanced Statistics under Jack. And that
was another treat. So there is a kind of mutual
admiration society working.
JACK BORSTING: Let me interrupt for a
moment. This was an elective course where the
students presented papers and had an oral
exam, one-on-one with me.
WAYNE HUGHES: Sort of like a Ph.D.
defending a dissertation.
JACK BORSTING: I thought that would
be a different experience for the students—how
was it Wayne?
WAYNE HUGHES: I don’t remember. I
think I blacked out. I do remember Bob Read
taught statistics then too. In those days nobody
knew how to teach statistics except using
proofs. The best thing about Bob was he was
compassionate. Russ Richards came along later
though I never had him in class. But I would
like to mention Peyt Cunningham and Doc Tor-
rance, who along with Jack, got the OA pro-
gram off the ground. But they started in ’51 and
it was I think almost a two-man show. Peyton
Cunningham was my thesis advisor.
I want to spend most of my time giving you
a couple of anecdotes I think illustrate of what
it was like to be a Fleet Analyst back in “the
good old days”. I’m going to emphasize the
fleet side rather than the Washington side be-
cause I think we all feel that we need to get our
roots back in the operating side under the phi-
losophy that there is a war on now. So let’s go
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out and observe the war and get data instead of
building simulations and getting data from
simulations. Let’s go out and see what we can
do to actually improve operations. We have
some of the most challenging operations. What
I call “peace making” is about as challenging as
one can imagine. And what are the character-
istics that are amenable to analysis and im-
provements that are comparable to ASW in
World War II? Well one of them is surely, “if
you can find them you can kill them”. There is
a lot to be learned from Koopman’s Search
Theory and all of the things that were done by
Dan Wagner and his disciples in the develop-
ment of search methodologies. We’ve got a
very powerful mathematician named Guill-
ermo Owen teamed with the Chairman of our
Special Operations curriculum, in the Defense
Analysis Department. And Guillermo and Gor-
don McCormack are looking at an algorithm to
help search for unique and hard to find terror-
ists. Let’s help prosecute the war on terrorism.
That would be my editorial for the day.
I’m going to reminisce from here on out. I
want to start by saying that one of the things I
am proudest of is how I got into the Military
Operations Research Society. I was invited to
attend when I was at ASWFORLANT as a com-
mander, a Captain selectee, and the MORS
Symposium was going to be at Ft. Lee, Virginia
which is just up the James River from Norfolk.
I can’t remember who invited me but it may
have been Erv Kapos because there used to be
a little cell of analytical interest that Bob Miller
started that included a great submarine officer,
Captain Frank Andrews. Frank had conducted
the search for the Thresher after it went down,
and later on had done a lot of things in acqui-
sition. So there was this little cell of people who
were promoting analysis at the tactical level
and one of them may have been who put my
name in for MORS. I want to tell you “who I
invited” to my working group I still have the
names because I kept the program. They in-
cluded Mike Sovereign, Stu Starr, a Fellow of
MORS famous at MITRE. Bernard Koopman
came and delivered a charming, absolutely
charming, paper on the limits of large scale and
high powered simulations on a mathematically
theoretical basis. John Kettelle was another one
of my favorite people. John was always think-
ing a little out of the box.
JACK BORSTING: Did he have his leder-
hosen on?
WAYNE HUGHES: He could have. John
teamed with Erv Kapos for awhile and had a
company and I know them both and they’re
both dear friends. Also Staser Holcomb, who
was then Executive Officer of the Saratoga. He
is in the fleet you see. It just happened that the
Saratoga was in port. I invited him to talk about
the evolution of the CV concept. We were going
from CVA’s and CVS’s to a combination where
the ASW aircraft would fly off the same carriers
as the fighter attack aircraft because we were
running out of aircraft carriers.
JACK BORSTING: You mentioned Staser
Holcomb. When did you get acquainted?
WAYNE HUGHES:He had a VS Squadron
when I was on First Fleet Staff and we both
lived in Coronado.
JACK BORSTING:He got crosswired with
John Lehman when John came in.
WAYNE HUGHES: Which is much to Sta-
ser’s credit.
JACK BORSTING: The Secretary of the
Navy, but I won’t comment on that. Staser’s got
an interesting part-time job now. He’s working
for Rumsfeld behind the scenes helping him
screen high level flag officer appointments. Sec-
retary Rumsfeld is approving the appointment
of high level flags in all the services, and Staser
is helping him screen these officers. Staser was
Rumsfeld’s military assistant when Rumsfeld
was Secretary of Defense the first time. Rums-
feld called Staser back from retirement to help
him. Staser is a graduate of the Naval Postgrad-
uate School with a Master’s in Nuclear Effects,
not in Ops Research.
WAYNE HUGHES: He was an early mem-
ber of the old OSD Systems Analysis with peo-
ple like Stansfield Turner, Jerry Miller, and Bob
Monroe and some other people who went on to
high office. One of the things the Navy did
right when McNamara was Secretary of De-
fense was take an “if you can’t beat them, join
them” attitude. We put some of our very best
down there to talk turkey with the whiz kids of
System Analysis in Alain Enthoven’s shop
when it was under Charles Hitch.
INTERVIEW OF JACK BORSTING, FS
Page 76 Military Operations Research, V11 N2 2006
The other thing we did was create OP-96,
and I’ve always thought that Alain Enthoven
was smiling all the time we were building up
an opposition, an analytical force to confront
and confound the systems analysts in OSD. If
you read what he wrote later, he said that he
wanted the services to have their own analysis
capability. And so we did, we built a strong
analytical capability. In those early days that
we did most of our fighting with the barons in
the office of CNO and were much less effective
at communicating with them than when we
fought with OSD Systems Analysis because at
least we talked the same language. If we went
to OP-05, the Aviation community, who ran the
Navy at the time, they just stared us down. The
submariners always had some of the smartest
people walking working in OP-31 who could
make every analysis justify more nuclear sub-
marines.
UNKNOWN: Later OP-02.
WAYNE HUGHES: That’s right. And the
surface Navy didn’t know what they were do-
ing but we were sympathetic because we
thought they needed help. And for the logistics
people we just did the analysis for them be-
cause they were hopeless. Until people like
Tom Hughes came along, an OA grad. Tom
became OP-04 later on and revolutionized their
capability to do good logistical analysis.
JACK BORSTING: Wasn’t Bud Zumwalt
the first OP-96?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes. And he was won-
derful. You were talking earlier about how the
size of the OR faculty grew when you were
chairman. Well when Bud Zumwalt was the
Director of OP-96 we started with 20 people.
Ten officers and ten civilians. By the time he
and I left two years later it had grown to 80. He
was an empire builder. Bud Zumwalt was, I
thought, a wonderful man. I will tell you one
anecdote about my experiences there. I always
felt like his office was open especially in the
early days when there were only—we weren’t
even 20 because we hadn’t filled out yet. So I
felt like I could go into his office and tell him
any damn thing I wanted to. Kind of like you
telling Harold Brown what you thought of his
approach to managing the Secretary of Defense
office. I’ve forgotten what the subject was, but I
told him he was wrong, absolutely wrong. And
he listened patiently for five minutes while I
explained carefully the illogic of his case. And
then he took another five minutes and con-
vinced me that I was wrong. I walked out of the
office persuaded—he was a very persuasive
guy—that I was wrong. When he was CNO of
course he sent out Z-grams and he inflamed the
hatred of a lot of senior admirals and a lot of
senior petty officers. But I’ve always said if he
could have worked with them one-on-one in-
stead of sending out messages he could have
built morale instead of causing the turmoil he
did.
JACK BORSTING: Zumwalt was not an
analyst by training, but he was still very good.
I remember talking with him about the use of
analysis when he was the head of OP-96. He
said, “Well you know, to me it’s not the end
result of the study that’s important. It’s the
understanding of the assumptions and under-
standing what went on in the model and then
what you got in the end.” He said, “You might
not do what the model told you but you
learned so much more about the process you
were studying because of the analysis.” I still
remember Bud Zumwalt in the early days of
OP-96 expressing his view about the use of
analysis.
WAYNE HUGHES: We had a series of the
Navy’s best and brightest in OP-96 in 1973
when I came back as the deputy; Admiral Zum-
walt was now the CNO. He’d gone to Vietnam
and had a successful tour over there. At a very
young age, he was leap-frogged up to become
the CNO. Harry Train was my boss; Staser
Holcomb came in to relieve him. They had
completely different styles, but both of them
were wonderful men to work for. And the ad-
min officer for both of them was a guy named
Vernon Clark. To this day Admiral Clark says
that his experience in OP-96 revolutionized his
whole way of thinking and changed his life. It
was that significant, the impact we had on the
Navy. In fact, I used to work very long hours
because I thought we were saving the Navy
from itself. In some ways that was true and
some ways we were kidding ourselves. Any
event, it was a heady time.
I would like to shift to the fleet side for five
or ten minutes, because I promised you I
would. When I was at ASWFORLANT staff,
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Zumwalt was the CNO. And one of his fervent
desires was a sea control ship. We should have
built it, folks. It would have saved us a lot of
development time later when we brought along
the LHA and LHD. It was actually conceived as
smaller than an LPH, which was 18,000 tons.
The idea was that it would be a mid-ocean
escort for convoys because we really didn’t
have a way to give them air cover. It was hav-
ing a lot of trouble with OPTEVFOR in its sea
trials because the guy in charge of OPTEVFOR
didn’t believe in it. In fact, a lot of people in the
Navy didn’t believe in it. So it was taken away
from OPTEVFOR and given to Admiral Fred
Bennett who was COMASWFORLANT when I
arrived. And he gave the problem to me to
design the exercise which would test it at sea
because I was the assistant chief of staff for
analysis. Soon I’m doing a reasonable job of
creating a rigorous plan to run the test ship
with its ASW helicopters and carriers through a
whole bunch of submarines and fend off low-
level air attacks because that was the vision for
it, low intensity attacks. But mainly it was sup-
posed to contribute to protecting the convoy
from the large Soviet submarine force. I’d been
working on it for perhaps a week when Admi-
ral Bennett called me in and said, “SUBLANT
wants you to add two submarines to test their
concept of the SSN in direct support of the
submarine, nuclear convoy.” So the purity of
the test is now evaporating. Then a couple of
days later he called me in and said that we have
this new surface ship with a tactical towed
array in the USS Patterson and I’d like to test
that in the same experiment. So the analytical
purity is getting to be out of hand. I took a piece
of lined paper, cross hatched paper, and did an
arrangement of the convoy and the Guam,
which was the surrogate sea control ship, and
two submarines and the Patterson with its
towed array and positioned them in different
locations and then called real living submari-
ners in and said “Okay, you don’t know what
the formation is but you hear the noise of a
surface ship here or here. Now, what will you
do?” Just professional judgment of command-
ing officers of submarines and I’m over simpli-
fying the process that we went through in ar-
ranging the formation. But the upshot of it was
that they would hear the Guam first and they
would try and get through the Patterson which
would be the next noisiest and as they ap-
proached they detected it from its screw noises.
So that meant that they would move out and
they would try to move in from the side where
two submarines would kill them and so on and
so forth. The formation was a great work of art.
No computer simulation, none of that stuff. It
was enormously visible and understandable
with a lot of hands on professional advice of
operators including me because by then I’d had
command of a destroyer and I’d grown up
working in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW).
We went to sea, and there were some crazy
things that happened out there, but the long
and the short of it is the task force commander,
who was a flag officer, also didn’t believe in the
sea control ship and he didn’t really operate the
helicopters as I thought they should be oper-
ated. So the test of the sea control ship was
inconclusive. However, the test of the SSNs
escort could be deemed a failure because it
became apparent to the submariners as well as
everybody else that you had to give them “no
attack zones” and that meant we had a mess
when trying to prosecute a submarine. You
really wanted to be able to say if you found a
submarine you had weapons free, you didn’t
have to worry about hitting your own subma-
rine escort. The submariners decided they
wanted to protect more jazzy things than com-
mercial convoys and military convoys anyway.
So they abandoned the idea of tying SSNs to
boring convoys and they went off and operated
with carriers which made a lot more sense be-
cause the carriers move fast unlike the convoy
and the nuclear submarines moved fast which
was pretty good for complimentary operations.
The Patterson array was the most interesting
thing of all. Every submarine was getting de-
tected by it. Yet this was only a simple proto-
type towed array. I got in a helicopter and flew
over to the Patterson. And here is the captain
sitting on the bridge. The captain ought to be in
CIC because that’s where the information is
and that’s where you fight the ship but it was
not yet SOP for the commanding officer to fight
the ship in CIC. And so he was sitting on the
bridge and it was probably just as well because
he was a political science type of guy and didn’t
know much about technology anyway. Still, he
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knew he had something really magical. I went
into CIC and here are the sound powered
phone lines going to a talker with a headset on
and he’s getting a message from somewhere aft
about submarine detections, ranges and bear-
ings. Next they led me back to the fantail and
here is this hokey arrangement of the towed
array tail streaming from the rear of the ship.
And all kinds of wires coming out of that tail
led up to the little helicopter hangar where
there were a lot of civilian scientists reading the
reports from the tail. When they got a detection,
they’d huddle around the oscilloscope and then
say “Yeah, yeah, that’s one”. They sent the
sound powered phone reports to the CIC and
CIC sent a message back to the flagship.
I’m trying to describe a situation where if
you really have something that’s a break-
through, you know it. And you don’t have to
have the thing analyzed statistically to the
gnat’s eyebrow before you take it to sea and test
it. If it’s a winner you will know it and you
don’t have to do a whole hell of a lot of analy-
sis. I came back and reported: (1) the incom-
pleteness of the sea control ship test; (2) the
folly of using an SSN escort anywhere (near a
formation, near meaning 15 or 20 miles from
the formation); and, (3) the fact that the Patter-
son was going to be revolutionary. In it I re-
ported that the Patterson’s array was detecting
our own submarines. These are quieted Amer-
ican submarines who aren’t supposed to be
detectable by anything at that range. The Chief
of Staff was a nuclear submariner and he said,
“You can’t say that. That can’t be true.” So I
took it out of the report and told Admiral Ben-
nett verbally that not only was it detecting all
the Soviet submarines but it was even detecting
American submarines. And the upshot of that
was the tactical array program took off. I had
another story or two, but let me pause. Maybe
it’s time for you to start asking questions here.
Chuck?
CHUCK WERCHADO: I’d like to ask this
of both of you because you both touched on it
at one time or another. I’ve been digging
through some of the old files in my office and
my predecessor’s predecessor, Art Pennington,
fought this good fight in the late ’70’s, asked
whether we should keep building large CVNs
or whether we should build what were called
then a CVV. Since everything happens cycli-
cally in the Pentagon we’re now again looking
at a Wasp Class ship sized carrier or another
CVN. Do you guys in your vast experience,
have you come to any conclusions on the effi-
cacy of an all big deck carrier or mixed large
and small carriers?
WAYNE HUGHES: Half of my life was
spent watching the debate over nuclear versus
conventional and big versus small, shall I go
first?
JACK BORSTING: You are going first.
WAYNE HUGHES: The year is 1979; I’m
working for the Undersecretary of the Navy
about the time Mike and Jack are coming in and
talking me into going to Monterey. And the
Congress can’t make up its mind; the two
houses are split between a nuclear powered
CVN and a conventionally powered large deck
carrier. The little carrier will come into this, and
I’ll describe how. So they do what they always
do when they can’t make up their minds, they
commission a study. Six months to do it. The
Senate, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secre-
tary of the Navy are favorably disposed to-
wards a conventional CV. But the CNO, Admi-
ral Tom Hayward, was hard over that the CVN
was the right answer. The director of OP-96 at
the time was a fellow named Carl Trost, later
CNO. SecNav Claytor told Woolsey that he
personally was to follow this study like a hawk
to make sure that it was honestly done. Wool-
sey told Hughes to follow this study like a
hawk to make sure it was honestly done. The
CNO, Hayward, gave it to Trost and Trost gave
it to CNA and I can confirm everything I am
telling you because at CNA at the time was
Bruce Powers who comes out here to NPS ev-
ery winter to help teach campaign analysis. But
at the time, what I am telling you was a sur-
mise. It was just a good guess.
They did the study in an amazingly short
time, in like six weeks. That meant it couldn’t
be as sophisticated as you might want other-
wise. I’ll explain what that means later. CNA
and Trost came back and delivered the study
and copy number one came to my office and I
immediately took it without opening it to give
it to Jim Woolsey. The CVV was a mid-size
carrier of about 35,000 tons that could only fly
STOVL aircraft. Doug Mow was the STOVL
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aircraft (the Harrier aircraft) project officer.
This was the AV8B and we had AV8As at the
time and this was going to be the updated
version. It was not a bad aircraft within its
limited range. Doug Mow came running, wav-
ing the study, and saying, “Look Wayne, the
study proves that the little carrier with Harriers
is the only way to go.” Well, I couldn’t believe
that Tom Hayward would send such a thing
forward. Thirty minutes later somebody else
came into my office saying, “Look Wayne, the
study proves that the CVN is the only way to
go.” Thirty minutes later a known partisan of
the CV came into my office saying, “Boy this is
really impressive. It shows that the CV is the
only way to go.” So I went into the Undersec-
retary’s office and I said, “Can I borrow that
back?” I read the study and it all came clear. At
least two out of the seven scenarios explored
favored each of the three candidates. So if you
believe the kind of war that you wanted to
believe was the one that was going to be fought,
then your candidate won. Now, that’s ground
truth folks. If there was a clear-cut answer we
would have known 20 years earlier that the
CVN or the CV was the best and whether or not
a small deck carrier bigger than a sea control
ship but smaller than an LHA or an LHD with
STOVL aircraft was a promising solution. At
that time, I was convinced that the CVN was
the right solution for carriers, even though it
cost about 25% more than a CV. A carrier is not
a weapons system. You have to put aircraft on
it. The aircraft cost as much as the carrier. By
definition that’s going to be a suite of the 90
aircraft whether it is a CVN or a CV. So already
you halve the difference to 12%. We haven’t
operated anything yet. If you pulled in operat-
ing costs and you go the way we’ve been going
with a 40-year lifetime, then you need to oper-
ate the thing. The operating cost, whether it’s a
CVN or a CV, is about 4% per year of the
procurement cost. And the operating cost of the
aircraft is 9% of 10% per year of the procure-
ment cost of the air wing. So now we are down
in the range of 2 or 3% difference in life cycle
cost and we haven’t even bought a second suite
of aircraft yet. So if you’re talking about a 40-
year life, two generations of aircraft, procured
and operated, then the 25% premium you pay
for CVN nuclear power is now lost in the noise.
Anybody will probably agree that the flexibility
that you get by having nuclear power is well
worth the difference.
Where are we now? Well, I personally
think some of you know that I am a small
combatant fan because of the new littoral war-
fare environment with the potential to be sur-
prised and ambushed in those waters. I believe
we gotta have air capability but we also gotta
have a lot of fire power in shore and one way to
develop the air capability would be to have a
small aircraft carrier. The analog is the CVE, the
World War II CVE, which by the way was
about 10,000 to 15,000 tons in displacement.
Functionally different from the CVN, opera-
tionally envisaged as supporting the inshore
operation just like a CVE did. You can’t have a
“CVE” with modern CTOL aircraft which tend
to be big. But you can have STOVL and UAVs.
If you believe in the future of UAVs, which are
already here, then maybe you can exploit the
potential of small aircraft carriers. And so if I
had my way I would be exploring a ship of
about 10,000 tons that is air capable for the
special kinds of aircraft. Vertical, helicopters,
short take off marine version of the F-35, UAVs
and UCAVs. And it all goes back to the sea
control ship. If we’d have built some then we
would be that far along in knowing what the
potential was for this companion, this comple-
ment to the big deck. Big deck carriers are the
most efficient way to carry firepower to sea but
you can’t have very many of them especially in
this day and age. If we want to be able to
spread our air capability, and we must, in more
locations then it seems to me that’s one way to
do it.
Long answer, I know you knew this. Jack,
what would you like to add?
JACK BORSTING: Not much to add but
let me ask, would most of you agree with what
Wayne just said? What he is basically saying is
that it’s scenario dependent. And that it makes
a lot of sense to have it scenario dependent, and
you probably have got to keep looking at dif-
ferent scenarios because of the various types of
wars we’re going to fight in the future.
UNKNOWN: Does that answer drive you
to a solution that’s common across all scenarios
so that you’re ready for whatever the next sce-
nario is? You know, a little bit of everything?
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JACK BORSTING: Rumsfeld and com-
pany are trying to build future capabilities. If
you have capabilities, you can adjust to various
threats. An example would be the Army’s Fu-
ture Combat System (FCS). The FCS is very
network centric and will be able to adjust to
different threats, urban warfare, et cetera and
centralized warfare. So much depends on what
you think is the future threat. You’ve got to
have the capabilities to answer the many dif-
ferent threats we will face in the future.
WAYNE HUGHES: A good question, I for-
got to mention, I told you the sea-based air
platform study was done in an awful hurry.
What it didn’t do was look at mixes. I thought
then and I think now that the sophisticated
answer would be a mix. CVNs would be sub-
optimal in some roles but optimal in others. The
STOVL aircraft, the small carrier would have
been preferable in shore, for fast turn around,
intense delivery kinds of situations where you
expect to lose a lot of the aircraft. A mix would
have been the sophisticated answer but they
didn’t have time to do it.
UNKNOWN: I must admit to being terri-
bly confused by this. This friend was arguing
recently about capability based planning versus
whatever else we were doing because I don’t
understand how you can talk about capabilities
without talking about environments or scenar-
ios in which those capabilities are going to be
employed. So I don’t understand what this new
argument is about capability based planning,
which is very different from whatever we’ve
been doing in the past. Can you help me with
that?
LEE DICK: Chuck can really address it too,
but we’re basing all these capabilities on a myr-
iad of scenarios. We have the 12 key sets that
we’re looking at, that they’re both mid-term
and long term. And then we’re backing that up
with the baseline security postures, the little
vignettes, there is up to 25 of those now. So we
are very scenario rich in which we are applying
the capabilities against.
UNKNOWN: Well is that any different
than what we’ve been doing for years? Haven’t
we always argued that we need is a robust set
of scenarios?
LEE DICK: We never had the capabilities
to develop the baselines, put them on a shelf
and then pull them off and do our quick turn
experiments.
UNKNOWN: I think the key term is uncer-
tainty. Because in the criticism now, you know
I’m new to the game but the criticism has been
the past has been devoted to the most likely
scenario. After September 11 no one can define
what the most likely scenario is. So it requires a
look across a wide range of scenarios to re-
spond to uncertainty, which is why the systems
you buy have to have multiple capabilities to
respond to the multiple environments. When
attempts to move in that direction occurred
they failed, no one liked them, no one thought
they were realistic, et cetera, so the desire now
is to have this large scenario set that Lee was
talking about that illustrate the current capabil-
ities in these realms of uncertainty that they
want us to be able to respond to.
LEE DICK: And also it’s not just a wide
range of scenarios but that scenario told you
what the C-day, I-day, D-day was, whether
there’d be nuke or non-nuke use. Now if you
look at the new ones from policy it says here’s
the range of parameters, we’re going to go fight
Iran, okay. Here’s most likely warning, here’s
worst case warning, here’s best case warning.
Also, here’s most likely, here’s worst case, so
you have a scalable parameter set for each of
the variables in the scenario. So you’re not de-
signing against a point solution, you’re design-
ing against a range of problems.
UNKNOWN: I have to stand up and say
that really isn’t any different than what we’ve
always been talking about as good analysis. We
have always said we need multiple scenarios;
we need to test the system to get the variety of
circumstances.
UNKNOWN: I think the change is the Se-
nior Leadership Guide.
UNKNOWN: I just heard what you said. I
work in FCS right now and we have one lousy
scenario. And they’re making million dollar de-
cisions for what’s going into the FCS on one
lousy scenario. So I don’t know what you guys
are getting down there.
UNKNOWN: No, it’s a choice of the
United States Army because they have only one
BCT scenario that they can use.
UNKNOWN: You know, they might be
telling you something.
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UNKNOWN: No, seriously. The strategic
planning guide that says you shall size your
forces against a combination of one four two
one. There’s no excuse to be looking at one
scenario anymore.
JACK BORSTING: This is not really a her-
itage topic. {Laughter}
GENE VISCO: Maybe it is because what
they are saying to us is we did a lousy job for
the last 40 or 50 years.
JACK BORSTING: No, I don’t think
they’re saying that, Gene. Let me put it very
simply. I believe they are saying that most of
the time most countries have looked to fight the
next war based on the last war. And we don’t
want to do this as we face many possible new
threats. Let’s change the force structure so we
have more flexibility and therefore more capa-
bilities to do different things. That’s how I un-
derstand it. Of course, many things are going to
be the same, but you want to be able to think
out of the box so you can develop new strate-
gies.
Currently, I’m on the Army Science Board
and am on a personnel, training and leadership
panel for the FCS system and urban warfare.
Hopefully we can explore new threats that we
may face in future conflicts. Not just urban
warfare as we know it now, but some other
new threats that could develop. When we were
fighting the Cold War things were easy. We
had one opponent which we knew very well,
and that made our defense very easy to struc-
ture. Once the Cold War stopped, we’ve got a
mess, as Russ Ackoff would say. He liked to
talk about messes when solving difficult OR
problems. In defense, we’ve got a lot of messes
around that we have to worry about for the
future.
You’ve got to be able to train and get com-
petent leaders down the chain because they are
going to be out in the field with computers and
information. Many successful things happened
in Afghanistan because sharp computer en-
listed types were able to ad hoc as things broke
down. They could make the system work and
get the job done. We’ve got to be able to get
education and leadership in our training sys-
tems for officers and enlisted.
What time are we supposed to quit? About
one? So we’d better lock up and—
UNKNOWN: Declare victory.
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